What checkers actually check:an eye tracking study of inhibitory control and working memory by Harkin, Ben et al.
What Checkers Actually Check: An Eye Tracking Study of
Inhibitory Control and Working Memory
Ben Harkin1, Sebastien Miellet2, Klaus Kessler1*
1 Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom, 2 Psychology, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland
Abstract
Background: Not only is compulsive checking the most common symptom in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) with an
estimated prevalence of 50–80% in patients, but approximately ,15% of the general population reveal subclinical checking
tendencies that impact negatively on their performance in daily activities. Therefore, it is critical to understand how
checking affects attention and memory in clinical as well as subclinical checkers. Eye fixations are commonly used as
indicators for the distribution of attention but research in OCD has revealed mixed results at best.
Methodology/Principal Finding: Here we report atypical eye movement patterns in subclinical checkers during an
ecologically valid working memory (WM) manipulation. Our key manipulation was to present an intermediate probe during
the delay period of the memory task, explicitly asking for the location of a letter, which, however, had not been part of the
encoding set (i.e., misleading participants). Using eye movement measures we now provide evidence that high checkers’
inhibitory impairments for misleading information results in them checking the contents of WM in an atypical manner.
Checkers fixate more often and for longer when misleading information is presented than non-checkers. Specifically,
checkers spend more time checking stimulus locations as well as locations that had actually been empty during encoding.
Conclusions/Significance: We conclude that these atypical eye movement patterns directly reflect internal checking of
memory contents and we discuss the implications of our findings for the interpretation of behavioural and
neuropsychological data. In addition our results highlight the importance of ecologically valid methodology for revealing
the impact of detrimental attention and memory checking on eye movement patterns.
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Introduction
Checking is one of the most common symptoms of Obsessive
Compulsive Disorder (OCD) with an estimated prevalence of
50–80% in patients [1–3] and approximately ,15% of the
general population [4]. Therefore, it is critical that we develop
an understanding of the cognitive processes that underlie
checking and specifically the manner in which these processes
differentiate checkers from non-checkers. The relationship
between checking and memory/meta-memory in healthy and
OCD participants has received considerable attention in the
literature. For example, an influential body of research by van
den Hout and Kindt [5,6] revealed that for healthy participants
enforced repeated checking reduced the vividness, detail and
memory confidence for the stimuli that were the object of
checking. This work group also reported that repetitive checking
resulted in a shift in the nature of memory recollections from
being detailed and vivid to being hazy, indefinite and unclear
[7]. Therefore, while the authors clearly showed the deleterious
outcomes of checking, the exact mechanism of memory
interference was not discussed. Radomsky and Alcolado [8]
provided a more specific indication of not only the mechanism
but the domain specificity of checking. They asked healthy
participants to either mentally check their memory of an
electrical stove or physically check an electrical stove. Mental
checking required participants to ‘‘… imagine your hand
manipulating the knobs, just like you would see yourself doing
so in a real physical check’’ ([8] p. 347]). Memory accuracy was
then determined with respect to the question: ‘‘Which three
knobs did you check on the last trial?’’ (p. 347). The observed
impairments were modality-specific: Repeated mental checking
only impaired memory and metamemory for mental but not
physical checks. Whereas, repeated physical checking only
impaired memory and metamemory for physical but not mental
checks. Domain specificity is further substantiated with compul-
sive staring resulting in distrust in perception not memory
[9,10], whereas checking memory produced distrust in memory
not perception (see [11]). Thus, low memory confidence may be
a risk factor for checking, especially in a context of uncertainty
[12], a suggestion confirmed by Alcolado and Radomsky [13]
who showed that healthy participants who received false
feedback (low memory confidence condition) had stronger urges
to check than those who received positive feedback (high
memory confidence condition). Thus, memory is a target of
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checking especially in situations of poor confidence and/or
uncertainty.
Cognitive theories of compulsive checking in OCD indicate that
checkers are deficient in inhibiting misleading information and
tolerating uncertainty, which likely motivates reassurance-based
checking of memory. In this context, inhibition is defined as the
ability to ignore stimuli/thoughts which are irrelevant to optimal
task performance [14]. For example, Omori et al. [15] showed
that checkers (not washers) have impairments in memory that are
associated with dysfunctional inhibitory control. More specifical-
ly,our previous research has shed further light on the cognitive
processes which differentiate the working memory (WM) perfor-
mance of high from low checkers [16–19]. We introduced a novel
manipulation [18] by presenting a transitory intermediate
distraction between encoding and memory recall asking partici-
pants to indicate the location of a stimulus that was either part
(resolvable) or not part (misleading) of the encoding set. We found
that only high checkers’ recall performance on the actual memory
task was impaired when preceded specifically by a misleading and
uncertainty inducing manipulation. This is consistent with the
finding that an inability to tolerate uncertainty has been shown to
differentiate checkers from non-checkers [12], with intolerance of
uncertainty associated with checking frequency [20]. Also Kyrios
et al [21] reported that checkers had significantly worse
performance on a pattern recognition task and had slower motoric
responses in a planning task compared to washers. This latter
impairment is evidence that checkers are more deliberate – i.e.,
they are checking – in performing a task which requires WM
processes. In a related manner, Rotge et al. [22] reported that
OCD checkers took longer than OCD non-checkers for verifying
working memory probes. They concluded that increased ‘choice
making’ response times represented the degree of uncertainty and
doubt that checkers had at the moment of choice. Furthermore, in
trials where checkers had longer response times this led to more
overt repetitive checking behaviors, i.e., uncertainty motivated
checking [12,20]. Tallis et al. [23] also showed that OCD checkers
had impaired immediate and delayed nonverbal recall and
recognition. This is consistent with the meta-analysis of Woods
et al. [24] who concluded that OCD checkers have subjective (i.e.,
they lack confidence in their ability to remember) and objectively
verifiable impairments in working and episodic memory. Thus,
checkers appear to lack confidence in their memory which
motivates subsequent checking of memory representations (see;
[5,6,7]). These findings indicate that there is a close relationship
between checking and neuropsychological impairments related to
WM and memory processes [16,25].
The present study therefore not only builds on this body of
research but extends our previous experimental findings [18]. To
briefly reiterate, we proposed that when presented with a mis-
leading intermediate distractor, this tapped into checkers’ in-
hibitory impairments which resulted in them checking the contents
of WM [17–19]. However, we are aware that this was an implicit
assumption without actual evidence and so we now measure eye
movements to determine if checkers – in a misleading context –
‘actually’ check the contents of WM. Measuring eye movements in
our WM task (Fig. 1) will add substantially to the existing OCD
eye movement research which has revealed mixed results at best
(for reviews see [26,27,28]). For example, in a recent review of
thirty-three eye movement studies Jaafari et al. [27] reported that
OCD patients were characterised only by rather unspecific deficits
in form of smooth pursuit impairments and longer response
latencies in anti-saccade tasks. The majority of these studies
concentrated purely on the functionality of the oculomotor system
bearing little resemblance to the cognitive and emotional deficits in
compulsive checking. No emphasis has been put so far on eye
movements during more complex cognitive or memory tasks, and
specifically those which measure eye movements while tapping
into high checkers inhibitory impairments. For example, Kojima
et al. [29] measured number of fixations and exploratory eye
movements while participants looked at large geometric S-shaped
figures. They failed to report any significant difference in fixation
number between OCD patients and controls. We suggest that as
the content of such a task (i.e., geometric S-shape) is not
concordant with the primary symptoms of OCD patients it is
unlikely to have revealed informative eye movement differences
between OCD patients and controls [see 16 for review]. As
a solution, our study will provide the necessary task-symptom
specificity to result in novel eye movement group differences and
so advance our understanding of the cognitive processes un-
derpinning OCD and checking per se. We propose that as eye
movements reflect both attention and rehearsal within WM this
makes it a valid measure to determine how high checkers
differently search the contents of WM relative to low checkers
(for review see [30]). For example, it has been repeatedly observed
that participants tend to fixate on the previous location of an
encoded item during delay, indicating that the contents of WM
guide attention which in turn guides eye movements [31–33]. An
assertion corroborated by Theeuwes, Belopolsky and Olivers [30]
who suggested that attention always precedes an eye movement,
and that attention may serve as the vehicle by which information is
stored in WM [34–36]. So we presently used fixation number and
duration of fixations as a proxy of movement of attention. Thus,
measuring eye movements will reveal if high checkers differently
attend (i.e., frequency, location) to the contents of WM in
comparison to low checkers, and if this is specific to misleading
probes or not.
Therefore, the present study compared eye movements of high
and low checkers specifically during the presentation of misleading
and resolvable distractors. While previously we had placed a time-
constraint of 4000 ms on the responses to the misleading
distracters (henceforth called ‘Probe-1’) [18] we now provided
participants with unlimited time to make their Probe-1 response
(see Figure 1). This allowed us to compare high and low checkers’
response times for misleading and resolvable trials. Consistent with
checking the contents of WM to ‘see’ if a misleading letter was
present-or-not, we expected that high checkers would take longer
to respond to misleading trials, compared to low checkers and
resolvable trials. This is in line with previous evidence which
showed that OCD-checkers took longer than non-checkers in
verifying WM probes and that taking longer increased the
likelihood of checking, i.e., uncertainty motivates checking [22].
Therefore, this allowed us to investigate in detail high checkers’
unaltered oculomotor patterns and to compare them to those of
the low checking controls. Hence eye movements’ patterns for
both groups of participants were supposed to reflect realistic and
unconstrained processes and behaviours.
Accordingly, we expected to find eye movement patterns in our
study that would reflect the internal (i.e., mental) checking
behaviours of high not low checkers. Specifically, high checkers
would make more and longer fixations in misleading compared to
resolvable trials, as misleading trials specifically tap into the
inhibitory impairments of high- but not of low checkers [18]
fuelling their urge to overcome uncertainty by means of excessive
checking [37]. It was an open question whether we would observe
group differences in eye movements during encoding or mainte-
nance. Two experimental expectations are suggested: (i) checking
as a cognitive style could already take place during encoding or
during the undisturbed delay period or (ii) checkers might not
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differ from non-checkers unless their inhibitory deficit was
explicitly triggered by a misleading probe. Conform to previously
reported findings, the latter was likely considering the low memory
load presently employed [17,18,38–47].
Taking these arguments to a finer level of analysis we expected
to observe that on misleading trials high checkers would spend
longer examining the six locations of the encoding set matrix and
to specifically spend more time on locations that had been empty
during encoding, compared to low checkers. Specifically, we
propose that searching empty locations will be evidence of
a maladaptive checking solution to overcome uncertainty (i.e.,
‘‘Was that misleading letter present?’’), and will only be present for
high but not low checkers [12,20]. If supported, this will indicate
that checkers’ inhibitory impairments result in them accessing the
encoded set matrix as a whole and that specifically they might
perseverate on empty locations where no letter had been presented
at all. Simply, our hypotheses predict that as misleading trials
trigger high checkers’ inhibitory impairments this will result in
measurable differences (vs. low checkers) in behavior (response
times), eye movement frequency and eye movement location.
Methods
Ethical Statement
All experimental procedures complied with the Declaration of
Helsinki. Ethical approval was formally obtained from the Ethics
Committee (CEC) of the College of Science and Engineering at
Glasgow University (http://ethics.psy.gla.ac.uk). All participants
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the five Periods per trial. A resolvable trial example is shown in the middle left and a misleading
example on the middle right. Period 1, encoding of 4 letters presented randomly in 6 possible locations for a duration of 2000 ms. Period 2, delay
period of 2000 ms. Period 3 intermediate probe letter (Probe-1) which was either resolvable (letter was part of encoding set, e.g. ‘‘T’’) or misleading
(letter was not part of the encoding set, e.g. ‘‘K’’). Period 4, actual memory test (Probe-2) showing a probe letter of the encoding set either in its
correct or in an incorrect location. The eye and/or behavioural measurements recorded and analysed in each period are listed on the far right of the
Figure. Further explanations in the text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044689.g001
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gave written consent and were debriefed according to the
guidelines of the British Psychological Society.
Participants
35 student participants (mean 20.8 years: 18 males, 17 females)
from the University of Glasgow gave written informed consents.
The Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; [48])
was employed to evaluate all participants regarding their checking
tendencies. The VOCI is a 55 item, self-report questionnaire for
assessing the severity of OCD symptoms. Conform to our previous
research [18,19], the checking subscale was used to obtain two
groups: 17 low (mean: 0.71, SD: 0.92) and 18 high (mean: 12.67,
SD: 5.78) ‘‘checkers’’. Table 1 provides age and gender
distribution data for low and high checkers.
Procedure
Participants sat 60 cm from a 1999 computer screen ran at
8006600 resolution with their head on a chin rest. Stimuli were
capital letters in font Arial, size 18 and were presented against
a grey background within a 2 (columns) by 3 (rows) matrix
covering an area of 3006420 pixels. After 1000 ms fixation, 4
letters were presented randomly in 4 of the 6 possible locations and
participants had 2000 ms to encode the identity and the location
of each letter (Figure 1). After 2000 ms, the probe-1 question
requested the location of a specific letter which had been either
part (hence, resolvable) or not (hence, misleading) of the encoded
set. Participants indicated the location through a 263 spatially
mapped keypad and responded in their own time. Participants
were informed that they could ‘skip’ the intermediate probe – i.e.,
if they think that the letter present in the probe-1 trial was not part
of the encoding set. This provided reaction times and ‘skip’
percentages specific to the termination of resolvable and mis-
leading Probe-1 trials which we could then analyse statistically (see
Figure 1, Period 3). This differed from the original Harkin and
Kessler [18] procedure which limited the probe-1 response period
to 4000 ms. In a baseline condition probe-1 was omitted to
measure WM performance on the primary task under ideal
conditions. A 1000 ms interstimulus interval (ISI) separated probe-
1 and probe-2. Since baseline trials did not include the
intermediate probe-1 a grey screen was shown for 5000 ms
between encoding and probe-2. Probe-2 was the actual memory
test for each trial and required participants to indicate if a letter
was correctly located with respect to the originally encoded set. In
all trials the probe-2 letter had been part of the encoded set in
terms of identity while the probe location was correct only on 50%
of the trials. There were 190 trials in total, 10 of which (at the
beginning) were practice trials including resolvable and no-probe-
1 trials only. The main experiment was then done in two blocks
(with 5 min rest period between), each comprising of 60 mis-
leading, 20 resolvable, and 10 no-probe-1 trials presented in
random order. This asymmetric trial type distribution was adopted
from Kessler and Harkin [18].
Eye Tracking and Periods of Interest
Eye movements were recorded at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz
with the SR Research Desktop-Mount EyeLink 2K eyetracker
(with a chin/forehead-rest), which has an average gaze position
error of about 0.25u, a spatial resolution of 0.01u and a linear
output over the range of the monitor used. Only the dominant eye
of each participant was tracked although viewing was binocular.
The experiment was implemented with E-primeH. Calibrations of
eye fixations were conducted at the beginning of the experiment
using a nine-point fixation procedure as implemented in the
EyeLink API (cf. EyeLink Manual) and using E-primeH software.
Calibration was validated with the EyeLink software and repeated
when necessary until the optimal calibration criterion was reached.
At the beginning of each trial, participants were instructed to fixate
a dot at the centre of the screen to perform a drift correction. If the
drift correction was more than 1u, a new calibration was launched
to insure optimal recording quality.
In our WM task (cf. Figure 1) we recorded eye movements
within three key ‘periods of interest’. We concentrated our analysis
on number and duration of fixations, which were likely to reflect
internal checking behaviours, i.e., more and longer fixations
reflecting internal checking. Period 1 was the 2000 ms encoding
period, where 4 letters were presented in 6 possible locations.
Period 2 was the 2000 ms delay period after encoding and before
the presentation of the intermediate (resolvable or misleading)
Probe-1. Accordingly, Period 3 refers to the presentation of
a resolvable or misleading intermediate Probe-1 trial (see Figure 2).
As shown in Figure 1, the employed WM task included two further
Periods, referring to Probe 2 presentation and indication of
confidence, respectively. However, eye movements were not
recorded during these periods, hence, only behavioural data will
be reported for each period (response times, accuracy and
response confidence, respectively).
Results
Breakdown into Individual Periods (1–4)
We present our data analyses (eye movement and/or beha-
vioural responses) in the same sequence in which the participant
viewed and/or responded to each aspect of the experiment: Period
1 (encoding), Period 2 (2000 ms delay), Period 3 (Probe-1), Period
4 (Probe-2) and Period 5 (confidence). We focused our eye
movement recordings on Periods 1, 2 and 3 as these were the
intervals of interest specifically related to our group hypotheses.
Period 1:2000ms Encoding
Independent-samples t-tests revealed that low and high checkers
did not statistically differ in terms of fixation durations (t = 1.32,
df = 33, p=0.19) or number of fixations (t = 0.87, df = 33, p=0.39)
they made during the 2000ms presentation period of the encoding
set (Period 1). Conform to our expectations high and low checkers
do not differ in their allocation of attention during encoding.
Period 2:2000ms Delay
Independent-samples t-tests revealed that low and high checkers
did not statistically differ in terms of fixations durations (t = 1.76,
df = 33, p=0.088) or number of fixations (t = 1.71, df = 33,
p=0.09) they made during the 2000ms delay (Period 2) between
the encoding set and intermediate Probe-1.
Period 2b: 5000ms Extended Delay in no-probe-1 Trials
We conducted separate independent sample t-tests for no-
probe-1 trials, due to them having a longer 5000ms delay period.
In terms of fixation duration there was no statistical difference
Table 1. Age and gender distribution data for low and high
checkers.
Group Age (mean/SD) Gender (male/female)
Low Checkers 28.4 (7.5) 6/11
High Checkers 23.8 (4.3) 11/7
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044689.t001
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between low and high checkers (t = 1.46, df = 33, p=0.16).
However, we did find that high checkers (9.08) made significantly
less fixations than low checkers (10.97) (t = 2.12, df = 33, p=0.04).
While this finding is surprising it actually serves to highlight the
abnormality of high checkers’ making more fixations during
misleading trials in our subsequent Period 3 analysis.
Period 3: Misleading or Resolvable Intermediate Probe-1
Response Times (RT). A two (Group: low checkers vs. high
checkers) by two (trial-type: resolvable vs. misleading) mixed design
was used with group as the between- and trial-type as the within-
subjects factors. There was a main effect for Trial-Type
(F(1,33) = 51.123, p,0.000), with slower RTs for resolvable
(2240.9 ms) compared to misleading (1807.7 ms) trials. Critically,
there was a Group6Trial-Type interaction (F(1,33) = 6.065,
p,0.02). Analysis of the simple comparisons revealed that there
was no significant group difference in RTs for resolvable trials
(LC= 2196.4 ms vs. HC=2285.5 ms: F(1,33) = 0.308, p=0.58),
compared to a significant group difference for misleading trials
(LC= 1613.9 ms vs. HC=2001.4 ms: F(1,33) = 4.871, p,0.04)
(see Figure 2). This suggests that on misleading trials, only high
checkers appear to ‘check’ if a misleading probe ‘‘really’’ was
there, whereas low checkers quickly dismiss it and quickly
terminate the presentation of misleading probes. Critically, there
was no difference between low and high checkers in their
percentage of ‘Skip’ responses (LC: 97.9% vs. HC: 96.9%;
p=0.28) on misleading trials. This indicates that despite high
checkers taking longer to confirm that a misleading probe is absent
they do so to the same extend as low checkers.
Eye Measurements. Period 3 is the most critical of our three
analyses, specifically, as high checkers had slower Probe-1 RTs for
misleading trials (compared to low checkers; see Fig. 2). We
expected that in Period 3 high checkers would also engage in more
and longer fixations in misleading trials relative to low checkers.
We employed a two (Group: low checkers vs. high checkers) by two
(trial-type: resolvable vs. misleading) mixed design with group as the
between- and trial-type as the within-subjects factors. Thus, we
conducted a 262 ANOVA design for fixation duration and
number of fixations separately. For fixation duration a main effect
of Trial-Type (F(1,33) = 71.98, p,0.000) was observed, reflecting
shorter fixation durations on average in misleading (226.5 ms)
compared to resolvable trials (250.5 ms). No effects involving
group reached significance (all p,0.17).
For the number of fixations a main effect of Trial-Type
(F(1,33) = 10.19, p,0.004) was again observed, reflecting fewer
fixations in misleading (6) compared to resolvable trials (6.6).
However, a significant Group6Trial-Type interaction
(F(1,33) = 5.69, p,0.023) was also observed. Most importantly,
this was the result of high checkers executing significantly more
fixations (6.6) than low checkers (5.4) in misleading trials
(F(1,33) = 4.795, p,0.04), a pattern that was not present on
resolvable trials (HC: 6.7 vs. LC: 6.5: F(1,33) = 0.305, p=0.59) (see
Figure 3). Thus, low checkers mirrored the previous main effect for
Trial-Type (less fixations for misleading compared to resolvable
trials), whereas high checkers did not. Furthermore, considering
that misleading trials are the most common trial-type presented
(66%) this did not result in high checkers having carry-over effects
(i.e., based on expectations) which inflated eye movements during
encoding (Period 1), maintenance (Period 2) or for resolvable
Probe-1s (Period 3). This highlights the methodological relevance
of measuring eye movements during Periods 1 and 2 and allows us
to argue that high checkers do not seem to develop trial
expectations (i.e., based upon the majority of trials being
misleading) which influence how they either encode (Period 1)
or maintain (Period 2) letters and their locations.
Fixations on encoding locations during period 3. Con-
sistent with our general hypothesis, we had observed that during
Period 3 high checkers made more fixations during misleading
trials compared to low checkers (see Figure 3). However, as these
fixations were calculated from all possible screen locations of
Figure. 2. Response Times (RT) for Probe-1. RTs are shown by Group (Low checkers vs. High checkers) and for each Trial-Type (resolvable and
misleading).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044689.g002
What Checkers Check with Their Eyes
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 September 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 9 | e44689
a misleading (and resolvable) probe, we cannot determine with
certainty that high checkers actually accessed the encoded set or if
they perhaps made more fixations to the Probe-1 prompt (‘‘Where
was K?’’, cf. Figure 1) relative to low checkers. Based on our finer-
grained hypotheses we expected that when presented with
a misleading probe high checkers extensively examined the six
matrix locations which were presented empty during Period 3 (cf.
Fig. 1). We further expected that they particularly perseverated on
empty locations compared to low checkers and that these
checking-related patterns would be observed in misleading but
not in resolvable trials. This would provide evidence that, when
confronted with a misleading letter probe, checkers experience
a particularly high degree of uncertainty regarding the presence or
absence of the probe, which they attempt to overcome by checking
all locations even those where no letter had been presented. To
this end, we re-coded the matrix of six locations - presented empty
during Period 3 (cf. Fig. 1) - according to their contents during
encoding (Period 1). Specifically, we determined whether a partic-
ular location had contained 1) the target (resolvable trials only), 2)
any letter (resolvable and misleading trials) or 3) whether a location
had been empty (see Figure 4). With this information we could
then determine where participants specifically looked during
Period 3, in terms of the ‘correct’ contents of WM, despite the
263 matrix being empty. In concordance with our hypotheses that
focused on ‘‘time spent’’ on particular locations, we multiplied
number of fixations with fixation duration to provide a ‘‘total
fixation time’’ (TFT) measure for (1) target locations (resolvable
trials only), (2) non-target letter locations, and (3) empty locations.
Results for TFT. For comparing misleading and resolvable
trials we focussed on total fixation time (TFT) measures for empty
and non-target letter locations only (there was no target location in
misleading trials). We calculated a 2 (Group: high checkers vs. low
checkers) 62 (Trial-Type: misleading, resolvable) 62 (Encoded Set
Content: empty, letter) ANOVA, with Group as a between- and
Trial-Type and Encoded Set Content as the within-subjects
factors. The number of fixations and fixation duration values for
low (LC) and high checkers (HC) which were combined to create
the TFT values are provided in Table 2. It is important to note
that these values are smaller than those previously reported in
Figure 3 as we now focused our analysis on the six matrix locations
as opposed to the whole intermediate probe screen (incl. the probe
sentence ‘‘Where was K?’’, cf. Figs. 1, 4).
A significant group effect (F(1,33) = 5.85, p,0.022) revealed that
high checkers (443.8 ms) spent longer overall looking at the empty
matrix locations in Period 3 (empty + non-target letter locations
during encoding) compared to low checkers (315.2 ms). The
Group6Trial-Type interaction approached significance
(F(1,33) = 3.75, p=0.06). Consistent with our hypothesis, this
was driven by high checkers revealing significantly longer TFT
measures in misleading trials compared to low checkers
(F(1,33) = 7.62, p,0.01), whereas no group differences were
observed in resolvable trials (F(1,33) = 2.29, p=0.14). Critically,
this supports our previous Group6Trial-Type interaction pre-
sented in Figure 3 and shows that when presented with a mis-
leading probe high checkers access the six encoded set locations to
a greater extent (TFT) than low checkers.
As we were particularly interested in TFT at empty locations we
conducted a 2 (Group: high checkers vs. low checkers) 62 (Trial-
Type: misleading, resolvable) ANOVA. There was a marginal
Group6Trial-Type interaction (F(1,33) = 3.75, p=0.063) (see
Figure 3. Fixation numbers for Period 3. Graph shows the Group6Trial-Type interaction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044689.g003
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Figure 5; left plot). Analysis of the simple group comparisons
revealed that, in comparison to low checkers, high checkers had
a significantly longer TFT in misleading (LC: 493.3 ms vs. HC:
732.7 ms; F(1,33) = 6.09, p,0.019) but not in resolvable trials
(F(1,33) = 0.77, p,0.39). Thus, high checkers spent 239.4 ms
longer looking at empty locations relative to low checkers. Also
within-group effects revealed that high checkers had a significantly
larger TFT (F(1,33) = 14.27, p,0.0007) on misleading compared
to resolvable trials, a pattern not present for low checkers
(F(1,33) = 0.97, p,0.34). Importantly, there were no group effects
for letter locations (see Figure 5; right plot) suggesting that the
Group6Trial-Type interaction in the 3 way ANOVA was driven
by high checkers perseverating on empty locations. To sum up,
high checkers focus significantly more on the six encoding set
locations as a whole, and specifically longer at empty locations in
comparison to low checkers, a pattern that is specifically observed
in misleading trials.
Finally, high and low checkers did not significantly differ
(p=0.64) in TFT to correct Probe-1 target-letter locations
(resolvable trials only). This highlights that high checkers are not
impaired in their ability to accurately locate an actual target letter
based on their WM representations.
Periods 4: Probe-2 Response Times and Accuracy
A two (Group: low checkers vs. high checkers) by three (trial-type:
resolvable, misleading, no-probe1) by two (probe-2 location: correct,
incorrect) mixed design was used with group as the between- and
trial-type and probe-2 location as the within-subjects factors. Thus,
ANOVAs for a 26362 design were carried out on Probe-2
reaction times (RT) and accuracy (ACC: percent correct). For RTs
a main effect of Trial-Type (F(2,66) = 11.20, p,0.000), reflected
faster RTs for misleading (1896.8ms) compared to resolvable
(2130.8 ms) and no-probe-1 trials (2153.9 ms). A main effect for
Probe-2 Location (F(1,33) = 70.39, p,0.000) revealed that RTs
were overall faster for a correctly located (1919.5 ms) compared to
an incorrectly located (2183.5 ms) letter. There was a significant
Group6Trial-Type6Probe-2 Location interaction, which was
driven by different between-group response patterns in the correct
and incorrect Probe-2 conditions. Specifically, the only between-
group (LC vs. HC) comparison to statistically differ (F(1,33) = 4.77,
p,0.004) in the correct probe-2 condition was for no-probe-1
trials, with high checkers (2256.6 ms) significantly slower than low
checkers (1810.6 ms). Whereas, in the incorrect probe-2 condition
the group difference was only present for misleading trials
(F(1,33) = 4.96, p,0.03), with high checkers (2192.1 ms) again
slower than low checkers (1898.8ms). For ACC data no effects
reached significance.
Discussion
Conform to our hypotheses checkers’ eye movements revealed
that they were less able to ignore a misleading probe than non-
checkers. Firstly, checkers made more fixations during the
Figure 4. Breakdown of Period 3 analysis. In Period 3 an empty
matrix was shown together with Probe-1 that could be either resolvable
(top) or misleading (bottom) The matrix entries during Period 3 were
then re-labelled in terms of what they had contained during encoding:
‘empty’, ‘letter’ or ‘target’ – with the latter only possible for resolvable
trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044689.g004
Table 2. Fixation numbers and durations for matrix locations in Period 3.
Fixation Number Fixation Duration
Trial-Type Encoding Content LC HC LC HC
Resolvable Empty 1.36 (0.5) 1.45 (0.4) 292.54 (97.7) 344.90 (91.8)
Letter 0.86 (0.2) 0.95 (0.3) 186.32 (56.7) 221.24 (97.5)
Target 2.15 (0.5) 1.98 (0.8) 584.14 (207.7) 656.04 (236.7)
Misleading Empty 1.49 (0.4) 1.74 (0.4) 313.54 (79.3) 403.34 (94.5)
Letter 0.85 (0.2) 1.03 (0.5) 176.96 (66.6) 223.78 (115.4)
Values are mean 6SD. LC indicates the ‘low’ and HC the ‘high’ checking group. Data are separated into ‘empty’, ‘letter’, and ‘letter’ locations, based on the locations’
contents during encoding. Note that T is only applicable to resolvable trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044689.t002
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presentation of a misleading probe compared to low checkers,
a group difference that was not observed for resolvable trials. This
group by trial-type interaction was mirrored in response times,
where checkers took significantly longer to ‘skip’ a misleading trial
relative to low checkers; again a pattern not present for resolvable
trials. Secondly, we used the contents of the encoding set (Period 1)
to determine what was driving participants’ fixations, i.e. what
types of information they preferably checked during the Probe-1
period (Period 3). This revealed that in misleading trials high
checkers Total Fixations Times (TFT) were greater to the six
locations of the encoding set matrix and specifically its empty
locations, in comparison to low checkers and resolvable trials. No
group effects were observed for letter locations suggesting that high
checkers greater TFTs to the encoding set matrix as a whole were
driven by group differences at empty locations. The specificity of
this pattern argues against the idea that checkers simply made
more fixations as the result of their longer response times (RTs).
No group differences in eye movements were observed during
Period 1 or 2, which indicates that subclinical checkers were not
affected in their default mechanisms for how they either encoded
or maintained letters in locations within the episodic buffer of
WM. The episodic buffer was provided as an explanation for the
manner in which the cognitive system successfully binds in-
formation into a coherent WM representation, i.e., binding letters
to locations [49]. Therefore, conform to our current expectations
and previous papers [18,19], misleading trials tap into checkers’
established impairments in inhibition [15,50] which results in
them engaging in excessive checking of their representations in
WM, comparing these even against empty, uninformative
locations.
Not only do our results highlight that eye movements are a valid
measure of latent deficits in inhibitory functioning but they parallel
the findings and conclusions of studies which show abnormal brain
functioning despite intact WM performance. Ciesielski et al. [46]
reported excellent performance of OCD patients and controls (all:
.92.2%) in WM tasks similar to those currently employed.
However, despite this, they reported that OCD patients had a low
prestimulus (reference) alpha which is a neural marker associated
with difficulty in inhibiting distractors, irrelevant details and/or
ongoing intrinsic obsessive thinking [51,52]. This suggests that
OCD participants are primed to be distracted by stimuli which are
external in origin and irrelevant to the task. Again, in a WM task
similar to that we employed, Ciesielski et al. [53] reported no
differences in accuracy (all .96.7%), but did report longer
reaction times for OCD patients relative to controls. OCD
patients’ behavioural responses (longer response times) and cortical
activation patterns (increased anterior activation) were taken as
evidence of an increase in effortful inhibition which served to
compensate for a repetitive or more detailed monitoring of WM
processes. Koch et al. [54] also observed slower responding of
OCD patients in a WM task and attributed this to intrusive
thoughts, performance monitoring (wariness) and fear of making
an error. Prolonged responding indicates that deliberately
checking the contents of WM (i.e., empty and uninformative
locations) is potentially a core impairment of OCD, particularly in
a context of misleading information and/or thoughts. Similarly,
Henseler et al. [47] reported that OCD patients and controls
Figure 5. Total Fixation Time (TFT) interaction plot for Period 3. TFT was calculated as number of fixation multiplied by fixation duration.
Group (Low Checker vs. High Checker)6Trial-Type (Resolvable, Misleading)6Encoding Set Content (Empty; left plot, Letter; right plot) Please note
that ‘*’ denotes p,0.05 significance level and ‘**’ p,0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044689.g005
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performed at comparable ceiling levels in three simple WM tasks
(all: .88.4%). Functional brain measurements revealed that while
OCD patients and controls had similar activation patterns
associated with WM rehearsal, OCD patients had significant
hyperactivity in these regions. These hyperactivations were
interpreted as compensations for latent dysfunctions in the WM
systems, which allowed them to achieve normal WM performance.
Therefore, OCD patients required greater cognitive effort to
achieve normal WM performance in tasks of a similar low load
level to which we currently employed. It is likely that OCD
patients were compensating for underlying impairments in in-
hibition (i.e., [46]) which only impair WM at higher levels of load
and/or in the presence of a sufficiently strong distractor [16,43].
These neuroimaging findings highlight the advantage of using eye
tracking as it may reveal abnormal cognitive processes not
otherwise revealed in traditional neuropsychological tests.
The abnormal ‘searching’ eye movements of high checkers
during misleading trials are consistent with OCD patients having
impairments in performance monitoring. Performance monitoring
in OCD has been examined with event related potentials (ERP),
specifically with respect to the so-called ‘error related negativity’
(ERN; [55]). Enhanced ERN amplitudes have been observed in
OCD that correlated with symptom severity [56–58]. While the
literature on the ERN is extensive, it reflects a number of cognitive
functions associated with obsessive-compulsive symptoms, such as
error checking, detection of conflicting responses/stimuli, moni-
toring of performance/conflict, ‘‘worse than expected outcomes’’,
strategy implementation, and uncertainty [55,59–63]. So it is
unsurprising that enhanced ERN amplitudes have been observed
in OCD and that these correlated with symptom severity [56–58].
Also van der Wee et al. [43] observed that in an n-back WM task
OCD patients had greater ACC activity at all levels of task
difficulty relative to controls. This was interpreted not as a deficit
in WM capacity but rather as one of abnormal performance
monitoring and/or compensatory processes. Enhanced ERNs
have also been observed in subclinical high scoring obsessive-
compulsive participants [64], which highlights the possible
quantitative nature of inhibitory/performance monitoring impair-
ments across subclinical and clinical participants. This is consistent
with the perspective that a subclinical analogue is a valid means of
understanding a variety of features relevant to clinical OCD,
especially as they are free from confounds such as medication,
clinical state, or co-morbidity [65,66]. Subclinical checkers may
therefore provide a ‘purer’ indication of inhibitory impairments in
our WM task. Specifically, checkers’ inhibitory impairments
reduced their ability to inhibit a misleading probe, which likely
induced uncertainty and resulted in them checking the contents of
WM at empty, uninformative locations.
In the present experiment participants could terminate an
intermediate probe in their own time; thus, providing high
checkers with sufficient time to achieve their elevated threshold of
satisfaction (i.e., overcome uncertainty) before terminating a mis-
leading trial. This is consistent with the observation that checkers
take longer before making a choice in a situation of uncertainty
[22], and that uncertainty per se motivates checking [12,20,22]. In
the current case self-pacing most likely allowed subclinical
checkers to engage and optimally satisfy their need thoroughly
search the contents of WM in a manner which did not interfere
with episodic bindings, preserving their memory accuracy in this
low load task. Indeed, the fact that on misleading trials there were
no significant group differences on ‘Skip’ responses – and that both
groups performed at an optimal level (both .96.9%) – is evidence
that high checkers used the extra time to attain certainty (i.e.,
correctly skip misleading P1 in their own time) and preserve WM
performance. While our study revealed novel results about
checking patterns in subclinical individual, where overall perfor-
mance WM performance was not affected, clinical OCD patients
might show similar or exaggerated patterns of checking following
misleading distraction that might also affect their WM perfor-
mance. This suggests clear predictions for a future study.
The clinical relevance of our present findings is that high
checkers’ inhibitory impairments for misleading information
results in them unnecessarily searching the contents of WM.
Our results may be particularly informative to interventions which
target inhibitory/attentional processes in checking/OCD [67,68].
For example, using an attentional modification training (AMT;
[69]) paradigm, Najmi & Amir [70] attempted to reduce
attentional bias to threat and approach behaviors to feared objects
in subclinical OCD participants. Using the dot-probe discrimina-
tion task they presented a neutral or a threatening word followed
by a visual (dot) probe. The participants’ task was to indicate the
location of the dot-probe as quickly as possible. The key
manipulation was the random assignment of participants to
a condition where a probe always replaced the neutral word (AMT
condition) or replaced a neutral or threat word with equal
frequency (control condition). Subclinical OCD participants in the
AMT condition had a significant reduction in attentional bias to
threat and increased approach behaviors toward feared stimuli.
Extending AMT principles to the retraining of inhibitory
dysfunction within the wider context of WM functioning may
serve to attenuate repetitive checking of WM contents and prove
most effective for improving a range of OCD symptoms. This is
supported by Omori et al. [15] who reported that only for
checkers (but not washers) were deficits in inhibition related to
impairments in memory. In addition, inhibitory impairments
within WM are likely very transient and rather implicit (i.e.
automatic) to obsessional-compulsive thinking [47,71]. Compared
to the more obvious obsessions and compulsions these transient
and implicit processing deficits might be easily overseen for
therapeutic interventions. Clinical response may therefore benefit
from a process of ‘‘guided discovery’’ [68] where the patient is
made aware of such implicit factors. Patients would be made
aware that their focused attention to task performance actually
does ‘more-harm-than-good’ and that they are actually contrib-
uting to the very thing they are attempting to negate, i.e., poor
memory, uncertainty, doubt. Indeed, it has been found that high
checkers’ memory performance is improved when attentional
focus is shifted away from the actual memory task [72]. This
suggests that contrary to the checkers’ intuition, a relaxing, non-
checking attentional focus actually improves memory performance
particularly when combined with reduced attention to intrusive
stimuli/thoughts. Future research in these areas would concur
with the recommendation of Muller and Roberts [73] as it will
establish if deficits in inhibition and memory play a role in the
development and maintenance of OCD symptoms, and if they are
viable targets for treatment.
The following limitations of the present study were identified.
Firstly, using a subclinical group always raises the issue of their
relevance as an analogue to a clinical group. We agree, however,
with Mataix-Cols et al. [65,66] that subclinical OCD groups are
a valid means of determining which cognitive factors play a role in
clinically defined OCD, particularly considering their reduced
medication and potential for co-morbidities. We therefore expect
that the pattern observed here with subclinical checkers could be
more pronounced using clinical OCD patients, yet, also more
variable. However, due to this focus on subclinical participants, no
psychiatric interview was conducted and so we cannot fully
exclude the presence and influence of other psychiatric illnesses.
What Checkers Check with Their Eyes
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 September 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 9 | e44689
Secondly, despite the claim that a subclinical group provides
a ‘purer’ indication of the cognitive impairments specific to this
subtype; we did not control for anxiety or depression nor did we
provide an independent cognitive index of attentional/inhibitory
functioning and so cannot exclude possible group differences.
Indeed, we propose that future research would benefit from using
clinical OCD checkers where we would expect the current
behavioural and eye movement impairments to be enhanced.
Thirdly, subjects were not explicitly measured or matched for
sociodemographic/educational status; however, they were selected
from an undergraduate population, thus, ensuring a homogenous
socioeconomic and educational background for all participants,
which is yet another advantage of a subclinical sample. Fourthly,
we did not measure other important clinical variables – i.e.,
depression, cognitive functioning – and so cannot rule-out their
influence on the present findings. Fifthly, as our a priori and
theory-driven hypotheses were specific to the inhibitory impair-
ments of checkers our conclusions are limited to this subgroup.
Future research would benefit by specifically comparing, for
example, high checkers to high washers, where based on others
research [15,23] we would expect to observe measurable
differences.
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